
PRIVATE VIEW| by Frank Wetara
Canberra Ave, Lynnfield, Auckland, New Zealand
What prompted the Solomon Islands to sever a 36-year-old relationship with Taiwan and establish diplomatic ties with China? In October 2019, Honiara’s shift towards Beijing attracted considerable attention from its traditional partners, leaders in the Pacific region, and Solomon Islanders.
This decision ignited a wave of criticism from traditional partners, with US saying the switch is hurting historical relations and further view that China’s charm would eventually lead to debt trap in the Pacific. In contrast the bi-partisan task force and cabinet supported the switch citing prospect for greater economic growth. These contrasting views resulted in conflicting narratives across mainstream and social media platforms and reports in both Asia and the Pacific. I decided to investigate this issue in my dissertation two years later, in 2021.
In this article, I aim to enhance public understanding of the foundations of the Solomon Islands–China relationship, particularly as China’s changing foreign policy and influence in the Pacific continues to reshape Solomon Islands and traditional partners’ foreign policies. While it may seem unconventional to write about work completed four years ago, I feel compelled to illuminate the context and rationale behind this emerging bilateral relationship.
The context for the Solomon Islands’ establishment of new diplomatic relations with China revolves around trade policy guided by the Trade Policy Framework 2014-2017, and the Solomon Islands National Development Strategies,2011-2020 and SINDS 2016-2035. Additionally, the shift from Taiwan to China was influenced by the One China Policy
The first key reason for this shift is economic stability: Solomon Islands experienced economic instability since independence in 1978. Establishing diplomatic relations with China is expected to create more opportunities for Chinese investment in the productive and extractive sectors, thereby promoting economic growth and stability. This relationship would enable Solomon Islands to increase its exports to China, building upon its export earnings of SBD $20 billion prior to the switch. According to a bipartisan task force report in 2019, China is Solomon Islands’ major trade partner, with potential for higher export earnings compared to Taiwan.
Second, among the pressing needs then were a sports stadium, road networks, airports, and wharfs. Additionally, China could consider investing in the establishment of a new National Referral Hospital. The current facility is ill equipped and under staffed.
In September 2019, Solomon Islands and China signed a communiqué agreeing to collaborate on infrastructure, agriculture, education, tourism, and Information and communication technology. In October 2019, they also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Beijing, aligning these initiatives in the SIDS 2016-2035. Following the diplomatic shift, Solomon Islands and China signed a security cooperation agreement in 2022. This agreement reflects a decision by Solomon Islands to expand its security partnerships in line with the National Security Strategy 2020 (NSS).
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang welcomed the Solomon Islands into this broader partnership, reaffirming China’s commitment to infrastructure construction under principal of market economy and fostering continued mutual friendship. The then Prime Minister Sogavare expressed that strengthening ties with China would help elevate Solomon Islands’ development goals.
After almost 50 years of nation-building, Solomon Islands with a population of 720,956, remains a developing nation. To ensure that this diplomatic alliance yield tangible benefits for the rural population, Honiara should establish a framework to manage these relationships to protect Solomon Islands national interest.
In 2013, China’s project costs in the Pacific Island Countries (PIC) amounted to US$ 5.12 billion for infrastructure development in Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Fiji. Critics contend that this strategy may increase the risk of debt dependency by Pacific Islands nations. .Despite these concerns, China is increasingly filling the gap left by traditional partners. In this context, traditional development partners could do well by reassess their foreign policy approaches and diversify investment strategies, to help beyond what they normally do
Solomon Islands should view China as a commercial development partner, while maintaining traditional ties with the West. Geopolitical and geostrategic competition in the Pacific are ongoing, and China is here to stay.
The decision to switch to China has been in the making for some time. In 1982 Honourable Alebua visited China to forge diplomatic ties with China. 1983, the Mamaloni led government opted for a relationship with Taiwan over China, and that lasted for 36 years. As Honiara sought economic development, it looked to Asia for new partners. In 2019, the Houenipwela led government considered the possibility of pursuing a major trade partner in Asia. Following the 2019 national elections the Sogavare, led government made a bold decision to switch.
Infrastructure and economic development are primary reasons for this switch. This diplomatic alliance with China is now six years old, and the policies and relationships between Beijing and Honiara continues to be tested.
Ultimately, the tangible outcomes on the ground in Solomon Islands will determine whether Honiara’s decision to partner with China is a success or failure.
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Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of In-depth Solomons. We provide a platform for the author to publish his work, trusting that he has conducted his own research and fact-checking prior to publication, in the interest of informing the public.